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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The ability of technology to extend and improve quality of life 
continually shapes not only the field of medicine as a whole but also the 
way in which healthcare is conceptualized and accessed at the individual 
level.1  As technological advancements continue to materialize at an 
exceedingly rapid pace, medical innovations are generally touted as being 
capable of providing patients with significant benefits and, as a result, the 
healthcare industry tends to fervently embrace emergent technologies. 2  
This tendency is counterbalanced by the U.S. Federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), which conditions the implementation of medical 
technology on the satisfaction of high regulatory standards aimed at 
ensuring an appropriate balance of safety and efficacy.3  Within this 
overarching medical landscape, the medical device industry is one facet 
that mirrors these overall trends and tendencies.4 
Medical device innovation capitalizes on advances in science and 
engineering to adapt biotechnology, nanotechnology, and computer 
technology, among other fields, to medical applications.5  Initially, medical 
devices were relied on to work in a discrete manner, and their narrowly 
tailored range of functionality enabled the FDA to regulate with a relatively 
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 1  Susan Bartlett Foote, Frontiers of Medical Technology: Reflections on the 
Intersection of Innovation and the Health Care System, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 79, 80 
(2005-2006). 
 2  Id.  
 3  Id. at 82–83. 
 4  Id. at 81.  
 5  Id. 
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high degree of certainty.6  Over time, however, technology has progressed 
to the point where devices are no longer finite but instead are developed to 
have adaptive functions.7  The critical question faced at this juncture is how 
the FDA should anticipate continued evolution in the medical device sector 
and prepare for the increased need to regulate software-based devices.8 
This Comment will analyze the inability of the FDA’s current 
regulatory scheme to remain effectual in light of trends evinced by the 
healthcare industry as a whole.  Rather than developing broad-based 
solutions, the healthcare industry is utilizing technology to target and 
remediate medical conditions at the individual level and will increasingly 
rely on measures such as robotic process automation and artificial 
intelligence to achieve this aim.9  The current regulatory approval process, 
which is predicated on the immutability of medical devices, is ill-equipped 
to evaluate and approve technology-based devices, which are inherently 
variable.10  Using this identified deficiency as a framework, this Comment 
will evaluate and compare the relative merits of implementing a novel 
regulatory pathway as compared to working within the existing regulatory 
landscape.  This Comment will provide a detailed analysis of the trends in 
medical technology and the ways in which artificial intelligence has, and 
will continue to, advance the field of medicine.  In many respects, 
technological innovation will continue to improve lives by redefining the 
boundaries of what the healthcare industry considers medically feasible.11  
Notwithstanding its innovative potential, technology is imperfect, rendering 
vigilant oversight and adept regulation not only paramount but 
indispensable.12  In anticipation of the imminent and unprecedented surge 
in the technology-driven medical device sector, the FDA must be equipped 
to regulate such devices.13  To successfully achieve the FDA’s mandate, 
this Comment recommends the implementation of a unique framework for 
vetting the safety and efficacy of algorithm-based medical devices that are 
 
 6  Suzanne Junod, Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the 1976 Medical Device 
Amendments, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 26, 26–27 (2017). 
 7  Id. at 30.  
 8  Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (2016).   
 9  Junod, supra note 6, at 30; see also Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1673. 
 10  Ohm & Reid, supra note 8, at 1673. 
 11  Elizabeth Kelly, Comment, FDA Regulation of 3D-Printed Organs and Associated 
Ethical Challenges, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 517 (2018).   
 12  Anna B. Laakmann, Customized Medicine and the Limits of Federal Regulatory 
Power, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 285, 325 (2016). 
 13  Id. 
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to some degree indeterminant because of their adaptive functionality. 
II.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FDA MEDICAL DEVICE 
APPROVAL 
Section II offers a broad overview of the federal regulation of medical 
devices.14  First, the major historical developments resulting in the FDA’s 
authority to regulate medical devices and the ensuing three-tiered device 
classification system are explained.15  Second, the general policy goals of 
the current classification system are explored.16  Finally, the authority of 
the FDA to regulate medical devices is contrasted with the definitive 
prohibition against its regulation of the practice of medicine.17 
A. The Regulation and Classification of Medical Devices 
The authority of the FDA to require advanced approval of new 
medical products is the result of incremental changes to the statutory 
regime over time.18  Before the twentieth century, drug and device 
manufacturers were under no federal obligation to provide evidence of the 
safety, efficacy, or quality of the products they produced.19  Congress 
passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938, conferring 
regulatory control of drugs and medical devices on the FDA.20  Initially, 
this grant of authority as it pertained to the medical device sector was 
limited, allowing the FDA to safeguard against the adulteration and 
misbranding of medical devices but not to require pre-market regulation.21  
The absence of an express statutory grant of authority to regulate devices 
 
 14  Spenser F. Powell, Changing Our Minds: Reforming the FDA Medical Device 
Reclassification Process, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 177, 182 (2018). 
 15  Id.  
 16  Id. at 195. 
 17  FDA’s Role in Regulating Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/home-use-devices/fdas-role-regulating-medical-
devices (last updated Aug. 31, 2018). 
 18  See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical 
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1757–58 (1996).  
 19  See generally id.; see also Kyle Lennox, Substantially Unequivalent: Reforming 
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, U. ILL. L. REV. 1363, 1370 (2014) (“Many 
remedies . . . for various ailments were not actually tested for their safety or effectiveness 
and were generally sold without guarantee of their safety, quality, or proven benefit.”).  
 20  Bonnie Scott, Oversight Overhaul: Eliminating the Premarket Review of Medical 
Devices and Implementing a Provider-Centered Postmarket Surveillance Strategy, 66 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 377, 380 (2011); see also Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government 
Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 
99, 104 (1989). 
 21  Scott, supra note 20, at 380. 
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prior to market entry resulted in the FDA classifying some devices as drugs 
under the FDCA.22 
The FDA did not gain expansive authority over device regulation until 
1976 when the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to 
the FDCA established a new regulatory framework.23  The MDA nullified 
the FDA’s devices-as-drugs workaround by broadly defining “device” as: 
any instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, 
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . . . 
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, 
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in 
man . . . [or] intended to affect the structure or any function of 
the body . . . .24 
Further, the MDA created a classification framework predicated on 
increasing levels of FDA controls and pre-market scrutiny for each device 
class.25  Pursuant to the MDA framework, the degree of risk associated 
with a proposed device dictates the level of pre-market control.26  The 
MDA classification system categorizes devices into one of three risk-based 
categories: Class I, Class II, or Class III.27  In general, Class III is the 
default categorization for new, post-1976 devices unless the FDA 
determines that the device meets one of two exceptions.28  First, a device 
may be found to be “substantially equivalent” to a predicate device that the 
FDA has already classified as either Class I or Class II.29  Second, the 
“FDA may make a de novo determination that a device” satisfies the 
statutory definition of either Class I or Class II.30 
 
 22  Powell, supra note 14, at 183; see Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 
Pub. L. No. 116-22  §§ 505(a)–(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (amended 2019) (Under the FDCA, drug 
manufacturers were prohibited from introducing new drugs into interstate commerce 
without first filing an application with the FDA.  Pursuant to this requirement, drug 
manufacturers had to provide “full reports of investigations which have been made to show 
whether or not such drug is safe for use.”  If the FDA determined that the proffered evidence 
was insufficient to establish the drug’s safety, it was able to deny the application.).  
 23  Scott, supra note 20, at 380; Hutt, supra note 20, at 112; 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) 
(2012). 
 24  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). 
 25  Powell, supra note 14, at 184.  
 26  Scott, supra note 20, at 380; Hutt, supra note 20, at 112; 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1). 
 27  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1). 
 28  Powell, supra note 14, at 186. 
 29  Id.; 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 30  Powell, supra note 14, at 186; 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(2)–(3). 
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1. Class I: General Controls 
Class I devices fall at the lowest end of the risk spectrum.31  
Accordingly, the FDA considers adherence to general regulatory controls, 
which apply to all medical devices, sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurance of safety and efficacy.32  General controls require compliance 
with the statutory protections pertaining to adulteration, misbranding, FDA 
registration and listing requirements, FDA labeling regulations, and good 
manufacturing practices.33  Examples of Class I devices include dental 
floss, adhesive bandages, surgical gloves, and other similar, low risk 
products.34 
Initially, all Class I devices were subject to pre-market notification 
under section 510(k) of the FDCA.35  Pre-market notification requires 
device manufacturers to file notification with the FDA at least ninety days 
prior to introducing a medical device into interstate commerce.36  Based on 
the understanding that Class I devices present minimal health or safety 
risks, the FDA has exempted the majority of Class I and select Class II 
devices from the pre-market notification requirement.37 
2. Class II: Special Controls 
Class II devices occupy the midrange of the risk spectrum and are 
subject to both general and special controls.38  Special controls tend to be 
device-specific and include, among other things, compliance with 
performance standards, post-market surveillance, and patient registries.39  
 
 31  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).   
 32  Id.; see Regulatory Controls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overview-device-regulation/regulatory-controls (last 
updated Mar. 27, 2018). 
 33  21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2016); Scott, supra note 20, at 380; Regulatory Controls, 
supra note 32.  
 34  Powell, supra note 14, at 186. 
 35  Powell, supra note 14, at 187 n.83 (Despite the fact that the requirements for pre-
market notification are now codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012), this form of review is 
commonly referred to as the “510(k) process,” in reference to section 510(k) of the original 
MDA.).  
 36  21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) (2016); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.87 (2016) (specifying the 
requirements of a premarket notification submission, which include device name, owner’s 
establishment registration number, device class and classification panel, actions taken to 
comply with any performance standards, proposed labeling, and information supporting any 
claim of substantial equivalence to a predicate device).  
 37  Scott, supra note 20, at 377–78. 
 38  21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(1)(B); Scott, supra note 20, at 377–78; Powell, supra note 14, 
at 187.  
 39  21 U.S.C. § 360c (a)(1)(B); Scott, supra note 20, at 377–78; Powell, supra note 14, 
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Examples of Class II devices include contact lenses, infusion pumps, and 
CT scanners.40 
Unlike the vast majority of Class I devices, almost all Class II devices 
must comply with the FDA’s general pre-market notification requirement.41  
Post-amendment devices, namely those that were not on the market when 
the MDA were enacted, must establish that they are “substantially 
equivalent” to a predicate device already on the market through a 510(k) 
submission.42  If a proposed device “has the same intended use as the 
predicate . . . [and] the same technological characteristics . . . or has the 
same intended use[,] . . . different technological characteristics . . . [that do] 
not raise different questions of safety and effectiveness, and . . . is at least 
as safe and effective as the legally marketed device[,]” then it may be 
deemed substantially equivalent and bypass the need for clinical testing.43 
Although the 510(k) provision was initially intended to be temporary, 
it has not only endured but has become the principal pathway to market for 
many new devices.44  Device manufacturers are obligated to submit a pre-
market notification submission upon first introducing a new device into the 
market, modifying the device in a manner that could significantly affect its 
safety or effectiveness, or proposing a new intended use for a device that is 
already on the market.45  Government agencies, such as the Institute of 
Medicine, and commentators alike have suggested that the prevalence and 
relative ease of satisfying pre-market notification requirements increases 
the risk that unsafe or ineffective devices reach the market.46 
3. Class III: Pre-Market Approval 
Class III devices comprise the highest range of the risk spectrum.47  
 
at 187.  
 40  Powell, supra note 14, at 187. 
 41  Id.; Scott, supra note 20, at 380–81. 
 42  COMMITTEE ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE 
PROCESS, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S 
HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 86–87 (2011); Scott, supra 
note 20, at 381; Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda 
.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-notification-510k (last updated Sept. 
27, 2018).  
 43  Scott, supra note 20, at 381; Premarket Notification 510(k), supra note 42.  
 44  Junod, supra note 6, at 27. 
 45  21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (2012); Scott, supra note 20, at 381.  
 46  Powell, supra note 14, at 188; see COMMITTEE ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS, supra note 42, at 193.  
 47  Scott, supra note 20, at 381; see Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval-
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Such devices are used in “supporting or sustaining human life or for . . . 
preventing impairment of human health, or . . . [possess] a potential 
unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”48  Examples of Class III devices 
include pacemakers, cochlear implants, and some surgical meshes.49 
In general, Class III devices must be vetted through the FDA’s 
rigorous pre-market approval (PMA) process, unless substantial 
equivalence allows for use of the alternative 510(k) process.50  The PMA 
process, which imposes greater demands and is more time intensive than 
the 510(k) process, is aimed at ensuring device safety and effectiveness.51  
To establish these aims, device manufacturers are required to submit 
extensive information and data derived from both nonclinical laboratory 
studies and clinical human subjects investigations.52  Prior to initiating 
these studies, manufacturers must first obtain investigational device 
exemption (IDE) approval from the FDA.53  IDE approval permits 
investigational devices to be used in studies for purposes of generating 
safety and effectiveness data in support of the PMA.54 
The relative burdens imposed on both the FDA and device 
manufacturers pursuant to the PMA process are significantly greater than 
under the 510(k) pre-market notification pathway.55  The average amount 
of time the FDA spends reviewing a 510(k) submission is twenty hours, as 
compared to an average of twelve hundred hours for a PMA submission. 56  
Additionally, the cost for manufacturers to complete the PMA process is 
three times more than the 510(k) process.57  Accordingly, manufacturers 
are strongly incentivized to establish 510(k) substantial equivalence in 
 
pma (last updated May 16, 2019). 
 48  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
 49  Powell, supra note 14, at 188.  
 50  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(3) (2019); Powell, supra note 14, at 
188. 
 51  21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c); Scott, supra note 20, at 381.  
 52  See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2019).  
 53 Device Advice: Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/how-study-and-market-your-device/device-advice-
investigational-device-exemption-ide (last updated Sept. 27, 2018); Scott, supra note 20, at 
381–82. 
 54  Device Advice: Investigational Device Exemption (IDE), supra note 53; Scott, supra 
note 20, at 382.  
 55  Powell, supra note 14, at 188. 
 56  Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478–79 (1996) (citing Hearings 
before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
100th Cong. 384 (1987))).  
 57  Powell, supra note 14, at 189. 
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order to avoid the onerous PMA process.58 
B. The Policy Goals of the Medical Device Classification System 
According to the MDA, the main objective of the device classification 
system is to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness” 
of the devices that the FDA allows to enter into the market.59  Devices are 
considered safe if the “probable benefits to health” outweigh the “probable 
risks.”60  Devices are considered effective if “clinically significant results” 
are achieved in a “significant portion of the target population.”61  The 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) is the division within 
the FDA that is primarily responsible for device regulation.62  CDHR’s 
identified mission is “to protect and promote the public health” by assuring 
that “patients and providers have timely and continued access to safe, 
effective, and high-quality medical devices.”63  Accordingly, to fulfill its 
mission of ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, the 
FDA must ensure that its regulatory review process is capable of accurately 
predicting the future impact of devices on human health in a wide range of 
circumstances.64 
The time required to ensure product safety and efficacy is in direct 
tension with the medical device industry’s goal of getting innovative new 
devices to market within a reasonably efficient timeframe.65  This 
conflicting consideration highlights some of the criticisms that skeptics 
often levy against the American regulatory system.66  As compared to the 
more expedited European Union model, device regulation in the United 
States is commonly considered to be “too slow, risk adverse, and 
 
 58  Id.  
 59  21 U.S.C. §§ 360c (a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C)(i), (e)(2)(A)–(B) (2012); 
Powell, supra note 14, at 195. 
 60  21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1) (2016). 
 61  21 C.F.R. § 860.7(e)(1). 
 62  CDRH Mission, Vision and Shared Values, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-devices-and-radiological-health/cdrh-mission-vision-
and-shared-values (last updated Oct. 23, 2017).  
 63  Id. 
 64  Powell, supra note 14, at 196; see also 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c)–(e) (2016). 
 65  Powell, supra note 14, at 197; see Letter from Jeffrey Shuren, Director, FDA’s 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, to the American Public (2010) (“[T]he FDA’s 
medical device center has been hearing major concerns about the 510(k) program . . . 
[namely that it] stifles innovation . . . [and that it] isn’t sufficiently robust to assure that 
some devices cleared under the program are safe and effective”.).   
 66  Powell, supra note 14, at 198–99.  
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expensive.”67  In light of this viewpoint, commentators have argued that the 
FDA should bring new devices to market more quickly by reallocating all 
or a portion of the required pre-market review to the post-market period.68 
It is crucial for the FDA to protect the public through regulation while 
simultaneously fostering an environment that promotes innovation.69  
Protection is essential because the public is vulnerable to medical product 
manufacturers.70  Manufacturers are privy to considerably more 
information about their products, which results in information asymmetry.71  
As medical devices continue to become more complex, the degree of 
information asymmetry likewise continues to expand.72  For example, there 
is little, if any, information asymmetry associated with the tongue 
depressor, meaning that the public can readily ascertain relevant product 
information.73  Conversely, it is unfeasible for the general public to 
evaluate the safety and efficacy of pacemakers, for instance.74  Encouraging 
innovation enables manufacturers to capitalize on advances in technology 
to create safer, more effective, well-regulated medical products for the 
public.75 
C. The Legislative History of the FDA 
Despite the complementary policy goals of ensuring safety and 
efficacy while simultaneously fostering industry advancement, the FDA’s 
legislative history reveals that it perpetually lags behind technological 
innovation.76  In short, the FDA’s legislative history is characterized by 
reactionary measures rather than comprehensive foresight.77  Congress has 
historically reacted to high profile catastrophes by passing legislation in an 
 
 67  Powell, supra note 14, at 198 (citing Corinna Sorenson & Michael Drummond, 
Improving Medical Device Regulation: The United States and Europe in Perspective, 92 
MILBANK Q. 114, 115 (2014)); see also Scott, supra note 20, at 378 (“U.S. patients must 
wait months, and sometimes even years, before the latest American-developed device 
technologies are available in the U.S.”). 
 68  Powell, supra note 14, at 199; see id. at n.189.   
 69  Marilyn Uzdavines, Dying for a Solution: The Regulation of Medical Devices Falls 
Short in the 21st Century Cures Act, 18 NEV. L.J. 629, 630 (2018).  
 70  Id. at 630–31.  
 71  Id. at 631.  
 72  Id.  
 73  Id. at n.9.  
 74  Id.  
 75  Uzdavines, supra note 69, at 630. 
 76  Uzdavines, supra note 69, at 631.   
 77  Id. 
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attempt to correct the disconnect between technology and legislation.78  
The shortcoming of such legislation, however, is that it imposes too great 
of a burden on the FDA in regulating medical devices without accounting 
for the agency’s resource limitations.79  Accordingly, there has been 
inconsistent regulation of potentially harmful medical devices.80 
Legislation enacted to increase the safety and efficacy of medical 
devices has historically taken a myopic view of the FDA’s duty to the 
public.81  This approach has resulted in an unfortunate oscillation between 
excessive regulation and insufficient regulation.82  More specifically, 
legislative reform can be characterized as taking one of two approaches.83  
Some amendments have sought to protect the public by increasing “the 
scope of FDA regulation, thereby increasing the burden on manufacturers 
to bring products to market.”84  Alternatively, other amendments have 
focused “on fostering innovation and the public’s access to drugs and 
devices, thereby reducing the burden on manufacturers without accounting 
for impact on safety to the public.”85  As technology continues to advance 
and algorithm-based medical innovations become more commonplace, 
there will be an increased need for comprehensive approaches.86 
D. The Division Between Federal Regulation and the Practice of 
Medicine 
Despite the FDA’s seemingly straightforward three-tiered device 
classification system and corresponding pre-market controls, the regulatory 
landscape it governs is inherently complex.87  Despite such complexity, one 
conclusive fact is that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate the 
practice of medicine.88  Accordingly, there is an acute distinction between 
product manufacturers that are within the ambit of FDA regulation and 
 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. at 632.  
 80  Id.  
 81  Id.  
 82  Uzdavines, supra note 69, at 632. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  See id. 
 87  Scott, supra note 20, at 382. 
 88  FDA’s Role in Regulating Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last 
updated Aug. 31, 2018) (“The FDA does not have the authority to: . . . tell providers what to 
do when running their business or what they can or cannot tell their patients[,] [m]ake 
recommendations for individual doctors, . . . [or] [c]onduct or provide a rating system on 
any regulated medical devices.”).   
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healthcare service providers who are beyond the scope of the FDA’s 
purview.89  Nevertheless, identifying precisely where the dividing line 
between these distinct entities falls is both crucial and contested.90  As 
emerging technologies continue to transform the field of medicine, such 
advancements are effectuating a shift from mass-market distribution 
models to customized, individual-oriented approaches, such as 3D-printed 
devices and individually-tailored software.91  Consequently, the distinction 
between regulated product manufacturers and non-regulated healthcare 
providers is becoming increasingly distorted, raising profound questions 
about the appropriate function of the FDA within the evolving regulatory 
landscape.92 
When enacting the FDCA, Congress made it abundantly clear that 
federal regulation was not intended to interfere with the practice of 
medicine.93  Although subsequent amendments to the FDCA expanded the 
scope of the FDA’s regulatory authority, this fundamental restriction has 
never been impinged upon.94  From the time of the original statute’s 
enactment, the FDA has never claimed the authority to prohibit physicians 
from prescribing approved products for unapproved, off-label uses.95  After 
medical devices receive FDA approval, states regulate their use in the 
context of the practice of medicine pursuant to state-based plenary police 
powers.96  Accordingly, the scope of the FDA’s regulatory authority 
encompasses the manufacture, promotion, and dissemination of medical 
devices, but does not extend to practitioners’ delivery of medical services 
utilizing those devices.97 
If technology-based medical devices incorporate algorithms to direct 
patient care, then FDA regulation of medical software may be construed as 
 
 89  Laakmann, supra note 12, at 287. 
 90  Id.  
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Laakmann, supra note 12, at 294.  
 94  Id. 
 95  21 U.S.C. § 396 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or 
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any 
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health 
care practitioner-patient relationship.”); see also Laakmann, supra note 12, at 295.  
 96  Laakmann, supra note 12, at 295; see also Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to 
Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 159 (2004) 
(“The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the police powers of the states justified their 
regulation of the practice of medicine.”).  
 97  Laakmann, supra note 12, at 295.  
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infringing on the practice of medicine.98  Irrespective of this possibility, the 
FDA has clearly asserted its jurisdiction over the regulation of standalone 
software products.99 
III.  THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE FIELD OF MEDICINE 
A. The Trend Toward Personalized Medicine 
The entire field of medicine has been impacted by advances in 
medical technology, which have enabled practitioners to offer unique 
treatment options to their patients.100  Not only do these innovative 
treatment alternatives reflect the latest medical standards, but collectively 
they also represent the industry-wide trend toward customized medicine.101  
Although most devices are not yet patient-specific, technology is 
progressing towards this becoming a reality.102 
With the advent of data collection and aggregation, large datasets can 
be analyzed using artificial intelligence.103  When implemented in the 
context of medical devices, such devices can process vast quantities of 
collected data to generate insights in the form of individually-tailored 
outputs.104  For example, technology-based devices that interface with 
mobile applications are capable of accumulating an unquantifiable amount 
of health and wellness data about users.105  Accordingly, algorithm-based 
medical devises, unlike mass-produced unitary devices that consistently 
perform in the same predetermined manner for all patients, achieve 
personalized results by adapting to the unique aspects of the individual.106 
B. Emerging Technology in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence 
With increasing frequency, individuals in the field of medicine turn to 
algorithms to assist in solving complex health problems.107  Devices that 
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incorporate artificial intelligence have the capacity to analyze and respond 
to data by changing over time.108  In general, algorithms are derived from 
sophisticated machine-learning techniques that analyze large datasets of 
health information.109  Developers of such algorithms are inclined to “keep 
information about [them] secret [in order to] preserve competitive 
advantage.”110 
Since their inception, implanted devices have served a wide range of 
functions, including physical, such as pacemakers and artificial limbs; 
chemical, such as insulin pumps; and sensory, such as cochlear and retinal 
implants.111  As technology has progressed over time, medical devices have 
advanced to incorporate machine learning technology and thus, have 
become exponentially more complex.112  This complexity stems from the 
adaptive nature of artificial intelligence, which by definition does not 
produce predetermined outcomes.113  Accordingly, there is some degree of 
agency that is ascribed to such systems, which is neither fully predictable 
by the device manufacturer nor fully controllable by the human agents 
interacting with such devices.114  The inherently independent, adaptive 
quality of artificial intelligence systems results in medical devices that, to 
some degree, “make autonomous decisions and . . . [act on] their own 
initiative.”115  The degree of device autonomy ranges from a “supervisory 
control paradigm, in which certain functions are automated with a human 
supervising the system, all the way to fully autonomous robots.”116 
Once medical devices are software-based, there are essentially 
limitless variations for the ways in which technology may impact their 
functioning.117  This inherent variability is the driving force behind the 
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regulatory challenges faced by the FDA, which is charged with ensuring 
the safety and effectiveness of medical devices.118  To achieve its mandate, 
the FDA must proactively confront the regulation of medical devices that 
incorporate machine-based learning, which can be characterized as moving 
targets.119 
C. Oversight and Cost of Care Challenges Associated with Emerging 
Technologies 
It is irrefutable that the United States is the global leader in healthcare 
expenditures, spending more money on healthcare than any other nation.120  
A significant driver of healthcare spending is technology, which presents a 
host of regulatory oversight challenges.121  Additionally, the vast 
complexity of the American healthcare system is partially attributable to 
the amalgam of applicable federal and state laws and regulations.122  
Accordingly, medical device technology is both “directly and indirectly 
affected by” a robust body of laws and regulations.123  This reality 
underscores the need for a nuanced regulatory framework that is predicated 
on an understanding of these vastly complex dynamics. 
D. Challenges Associated with the Regulation of Software 
Sophisticated medical software, robotics, and machine-based learning 
are rapidly evolving and contributing to the changing medical device 
landscape.124  With the advent of software-based biomedical devices, code 
is supplementing physical functionality.125  Consequently, the FDA must 
confront new challenges associated with the regulation of not only new 
devices, but also their accompanying software and digital output.126  For 
example, software increasingly controls the operation of medical devices 
such as insulin pumps and pacemakers, which means that the safety 
features of such devices are also dependent upon programming.127  The 
incorporation of digital features adds an additional layer of regulatory 
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complexity because software can be easily manipulated, allowing its 
evolution to outpace that of the devices it accompanies.128  Accordingly, 
software cannot be regulated in the same manner as devices because 
verifying the operation of digital code presents unique theoretical and 
practical challenges.129 
The FDA has long exercised regulatory authority over medical 
software.130  Despite its longstanding control, the FDA has promulgated 
few regulations specifically tailored to software or algorithms.131  The 
agency has instead chosen to issue nonbinding guidance documents and to 
regulate via case-specific adjudication.132  Notably, algorithm-based 
medical devices are typically approved through the 510(k) pathway.133  
Pursuant to this regulatory approval process, the “FDA has often 
determined that software applications are equivalent to nonsoftware 
precedents, even though they perform tasks in a markedly different 
manner.”134  This current disconnect between the implementation and 
regulation of medical software necessitates a narrowly tailored regulatory 
response. 
IV.  INSIGHTS GAINED FROM ANALOGOUS INDUSTRIES 
A. The Regulation of 3D Printing 
Like artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, commonly 
referred to as 3D printing, is a technological innovation that raises 
interesting questions about the scope of the FDA’s regulatory authority. 135  
Within the healthcare industry, 3D printing has the potential to significantly 
disrupt conventional supply chain procedures and thus warrants close 
consideration.136  Customized medical devices, such as joints and spinal 
implants, can be created based on individual patient scans with relative 
ease.137  Consistent with the general departure from mass-market 
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distribution to individually-targeted approaches, physicians and surgeons 
can use 3D printers to create customized products on-site.138  The ability to 
self-manufacture individualized products represents a marked departure 
from the traditional model whereby conventional suppliers mass produce 
and distribute identical items.139  The FDA has begun to address 3D 
printing, even though some critics claim that such localized production may 
fall outside the scope of the agency’s statutory authority.140  To date, the 
full extent of the regulatory implications of 3D printing technology remains 
unexamined.141 
Within the realm of medical devices, the primary consideration is 
whether the FDA will classify 3D printed items as custom devices.142  
Section 520(b) of the FDCA, as amended in 2012, states that the 
performance standard requirements of section 314 and the pre-market 
approval requirements of section 515 are not applicable to devices that, in 
order to comply with the orders of a physician differ from an otherwise 
applicable performance standard or PMA application.143  The custom 
device exemption is only applicable to devices that are “not generally 
available for commercial distribution,” are designed to treat a unique 
condition, and are manufactured on an individualized basis to 
accommodate the unique needs of individual patients or providers.144  
Although 3D printed products may satisfy the elements of the custom 
device exemption, it remains unclear if this pathway is a viable regulatory 
strategy for manufacturers seeking to circumvent federal regulatory 
requirements.145  Notably, the FDCA limits production of custom devices 
to a maximum of five units per year of a distinct device type.146  
Accordingly, the extent to which manufacturers of 3D printed devices may 
rely on the custom device exception depends on whether the FDA 
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determines that such products comprise their own unique device types.147 
Insights gleaned from additive manufacturing may prove to be 
informative in seeking to determine the appropriate regulatory pathway for 
AI-based medical devices.  Despite statutory amendments implemented 
since the enactment of the FDCA, the FDA’s existing regulatory 
framework is not optimally suited to vet and approve emerging technology-
driven medical innovations.148  Like 3D printed products, AI-based devices 
are perpetually advancing, and as such, represent a dramatically different 
landscape than what the industry originally contemplated.149 
B. The Regulation of Mobile Health Applications 
Technology has led to the proliferation of mobile health applications 
that perform a wide range of functions.150  Digital psychiatric therapies 
represent a growing segment of the digital health landscape and allow for a 
range of approaches to mental health care aimed at different populations 
and conditions.151  The FDA has the authority “to regulate digital 
psychiatric therapies as medical devices” if the applicable statutory 
requirements are met.152  Given that the science supporting the use of apps 
for mental health is only just beginning to emerge, it is currently unclear 
whether and how such mobile apps should be regulated.153  The FDA has 
claimed regulatory authority over mobile health apps and approved the first 
digital psychiatric therapy for the treatment of substance use disorder.154 
It is evident that the “current regulatory framework is inadequate” as 
applied to mobile health applications because it does not specifically 
address this treatment modality and, therefore, may not ensure safety and 
efficacy.155  The FDA has recognized that its “traditional relatively rigid 
regulatory approaches may interact poorly with the fluid and fast-moving 
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structure of the mobile-health industry.”156  Notwithstanding this 
recognition, the majority of mobile health applications appear to be subject 
to the FDA’s oversight as medical devices and are subject to traditional 
regulatory requirements.157  Guidance documents issued by the FDA fail to 
clearly address whether the agency will enforce FDCA requirements for 
mobile health applications and related software-based treatments.158  
Similarly, it is unknown how the FDA will choose to apply the 510(k) 
pathway.159  Due to their intended function, there are safety and 
effectiveness-related concerns regarding the use of digital psychiatric 
therapies.160  Counterbalanced against this concern, however, is the worry 
that increasing FDA clearance or approval standards could stifle 
innovation.161  It is possible that some software-based treatments may 
evade the FDA’s regulatory authority by not manifesting “an intent to treat 
or mitigate the symptoms” associated with a specific disease or 
condition.162  For the software-based treatments that do fall within the 
scope of the FDCA, there is a need for the FDA to articulate whether it will 
enforce its requirements when evaluating them.163 
V.  RECOMMENDATION FOR REGULATING ADAPTIVE, TECHNOLOGY-
DRIVEN MEDICAL DEVICES 
This Section explores the criticisms levied against the current 
regulatory framework as well as measures the FDA can implement to 
achieve a comprehensive regulatory approach that is specifically tailored to 
software-based medical devices. 
A. Criticism of the Current Regulatory Standard 
There is a general consensus among courts, commentators, and the 
FDA itself that the current regulatory approval process for medical devices 
is too slow,164 too costly,165 and too unpredictable.166  Given that software-
based medical devices can be developed quickly and are highly 
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customizable, the current regulatory scheme warrants supplementation.167  
Some algorithms change and progress as new data are incorporated, 
rendering them incompatible with regulatory approval measures predicated 
on the unchangeability of devices.168  Accordingly, rigid adherence to 
existing regulatory standards would hinder the development and 
implementation of innovative and potentially groundbreaking new medical 
devices.169 
If the incorporation of algorithm-based software necessitates Class III 
categorization, then medical device innovation will likely be severely 
impeded.170  First, automatically employing this classification will result in 
substantially greater obstacles getting devices to market.171  Second, it will 
significantly limit the flexibility of algorithms to change and evolve as 
manufacturers continue to gather and incorporate additional data.172 
As the preeminent public health agency, the FDA is charged with 
preventing unsafe and ineffective therapies from entering the market and 
reaching the public.173  FDA regulation shapes innovation within the 
healthcare industry by establishing the standards that drug and device 
manufacturers must satisfy before marketing their products.174  Some 
scholars have argued that FDA regulatory measures intended to protect 
patients unnecessarily hinder innovation and prevent patients from 
accessing potentially helpful therapies.175  Some have leveled this criticism 
within the context of the FDA’s regulation of emerging health technologies 
as well.176  Other scholars, however, “have noted the role FDA regulation 
plays in incentivizing the production of valuable information about 
regulated products.”177 
B. Constructing a Comprehensive and Consistent Regulatory Scheme 
It is incumbent on the FDA to evaluate and respond to concerns 
regarding safety and effectiveness standards, the risk of stifling innovation, 
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and existing regulatory uncertainty.178  To this end, the federal government 
should develop a separate regulatory framework for algorithm-based 
medical devices.  An optimal regulatory approach must be sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate the highly variable nature of technological 
innovation.179  The first step towards designing such a framework is 
understanding that pre-market controls are necessarily limited in their 
ability to fully vet algorithms that cannot be predicted to an absolute degree 
of certainty.180  Achieving a framework that comports with the FDA’s 
safety and efficacy standards in light of ever-changing technological 
considerations poses significant challenges.181  Despite such obstacles, the 
FDA can seek to ameliorate this shortcoming by enhancing post-market 
surveillance in the form of real-world quality markers to provide for more 
robust regulation following market entry.182 
Considering the scope of this endeavor, the FDA should seek to 
employ a collaborative approach that involves multiple entities.183  More 
specifically, the FDA should maintain centralized regulatory oversight but 
incorporate other entities in the healthcare industry, such as physicians and 
hospitals, to construct a more robust and elaborate post-market surveillance 
system.184  By diversifying the responsibility for post-market surveillance 
and oversight, the FDA can then implement an incremental, adaptive 
regulatory framework that has the flexibility to respond to new information 
as technology develops and new data is acquired.185  Such an approach is 
ideal because depending solely on pre-market regulation for medical 
algorithms will not achieve the optimal balance between fostering 
innovation and ensuring safety and effectiveness.186  Technology-based 
medical devices derive their value from their ability to interface with 
patients and amass data that can then be integrated into their 
functionality.187  Post-market surveillance measures would complement 
these algorithmic features in a way that overly burdensome pre-market 
approvals do not because of the time and resources required.188  This notion 
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is similar to incremental physical changes made to medical devices over the 
course of their lifespan, rendering a pre-market review of each iteration 
infeasible.189 
The FDA has already demonstrated a willingness to merge pre-market 
and post-market review in some contexts.190  When the FDA engages in 
pre-market approval review it considers what clinical data would be 
necessary to establish safety and effectiveness prior to approval, as 
compared to what data can be collected during the post-market phase.191  
There are, however, significant challenges associated with relying on post-
market surveillance.192  Most significantly, the FDA has long overseen 
post-market surveillance programs without much success.193  Compliance 
tends to be low because such measures are often voluntary and the FDA 
does not have adequate enforcement resources to compel adherence.194  
Despite this reality, there are three distinct measures that the FDA can 
implement to make post-market surveillance better suited to regulate 
algorithm-based medical devices.195  First, if Congress were to allocate 
additional authority and resources to the FDA it may be possible to 
implement and enforce surveillance requirements.196  Second, monitoring 
will likely become easier as health information systems continue to become 
more integrated, allowing data to be more easily shared.197  Third, if post-
market surveillance involves other entities in the healthcare industry 
beyond the FDA, then surveillance will be more comprehensive.198 
One feature that the FDA can incorporate into a new, algorithm-based 
framework is a backup regulatory program.199  Accordingly, the risks 
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associated with lessened pre-market approval could be counterbalanced 
through the construction and implementation of a backup program that 
would be automatically deployed if software adaptations are determined to 
be less safe or efficacious than permissible under current FDA standards.200  
This approach would accord new technologies greater regulatory freedom 
at the outset by permitting them to function without first submitting to the 
full range of costly, time-intensive pre-market restrictions.201  Under this 
type of hybrid regulatory scheme, software-based medical devices would 
be able to capitalize on the fast-paced nature of technological 
advancements while the FDA simultaneously safeguards against potential 
risk through more traditional, risk-based controls.202 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Algorithm-based medical devices represent the culmination of 
advances in both technology and medicine.  The industry is currently at the 
threshold of what is poised to be an exponential growth in medical devices 
that incorporate features of machine learning and artificial intelligence to 
enhance their therapeutic effects.  Although adaptability is the key feature 
of such devices, it is also the driving force behind the associated regulatory 
challenges.  To capitalize on the immense potential for unprecedented 
medical breakthroughs associated with improving duration and quality of 
life, it is critical that the FDA take affirmative steps to implement an 
appropriate regulatory framework.  Unlike devices that perform discrete 
and immutable functions, technology-based medical devices are inherently 
variable.  Given the impending proliferation of such devices, the FDA will 
face immense challenges if it relies on the current regulatory framework, 
which cannot keep pace with the rapid evolution of technology.  The 
optimal regulatory approach is to create a separate pathway for software-
based medical devices that enables the FDA to maintain flexible oversight 
over their safety and effectiveness without stifling technological 
innovation. 
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